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Reorganization as a Substitute for Reform:
The Abolition of the INS
September 11 th and the events that followed highlighted the
shortcomings of our nation's immigration policies and their enforcement.
Gaffes, such as the issuance of student visas to two of the hijackers on the
six-month anniversary of 9/11, reinforced public perceptions that the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) is an agency beyond repair.
Critics from both ends of the political spectrum have condemned the INS
for its failures. As House Minority Leader Richard A. Gephardt stated, "We
saw in the 9/11 incident some of the problems in the INS that many of us
had seen before.... It became clear, I think, to everybody in the country
and in the Congress that we needed reform.",
2
Consensus on the need for reform may be clear, but the question
remains of what shape reform should take. Unfortunately, politicians have
taken the path of least resistance by focusing on reorganization plans, rather
than tackling the substantive issues that plague the INS.3 The Bush
Administration and both houses of Congress have differed about what form
a reorganization should assume.4 Their proposals share a misguided faith,
however, in the efficacy of agency restructurings as a vehicle for reform.
1. See Eric Schmitt, 4 Top Officials on Immigration Are Replaced, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,
2002, at Al; see also Cheryl W. Thompson, Justice Dept. To Probe New INS Visa Error, WASH.
POST, Mar. 25, 2002, at AI (investigating an INS official's decision to grant visas without
following screening protocols to four Pakistanis who subsequently disappeared).
2. See Eric Schmitt, Vote in House Strongly Backv an End to IN.S., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26,
2002, at Al.
3. One notable exception is legislation requiring greater information sharing between
intelligence agencies and the State Department, which issues visas, and mandating the creation of
machine-readable, tamper-resistant visas. See Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of
2002, Pub. L. No. 107-173, §§ 201-204, 116 Stat. 543, 547-52.
4. See Details of Homeland Plan Assailed; House Panels Vote To Block Transfers of Some
Agencies, WASH. POST, July 11, 2002, at Al.
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These proposals are the latest variation on an old theme.'
Reorganizations have long served as politicians' tool of choice for
reforming the American administrative state.6 Such plans do have the
potential to effect widespread change by shaking up agency culture and
reallocating management responsibilities and personnel. At the same time,
the literature on reorganizations casts doubt on their efficacy as a vehicle
for reform. 7 As Paul Light has highlighted, the pursuit of too many
competing goals through agency reorganizations has often served as a
formula for failure.8 Donald Kettl and John Dilulio have documented how
the "overwhelming result" of agency restructurings has been "an
intransigent gap between the effort invested and the results produced." 9 In
practice, the main virtue of reorganizations may be their role as politicians'
symbolic substitute for tackling the underlying problems that agencies face.
This Comment raises doubts about whether any of the reorganization
proposals have the potential to accomplish their intended goals. It assesses
the potential and limits of the five main proposals to reorganize the INS.
This Comment concludes that the Senate proposal sponsored by Senators
Ted Kennedy and Sam Brownback is the strongest in a set of weak options
because it seeks to accomplish the least through restructuring and would
leave agency leaders with the most flexibility to make future changes.
Regardless of which proposal is enacted, the hope for reform lies in
politicians' recognition that "restructuring alone is not going to solve all the
problems, [but rather] just begins the effort"'t of reexamining the
assumptions, goals, and approaches of immigration policy.
I
This Part considers the limits and potential benefits of each of the five
main proposals for reorganizing the INS that have been raised in the wake
5. Donald Kettl and John Dilulio framed this point best when they argued that
"[r]eorganizations ye have always with you, a prophet could confidently promise." DONALD F.
KETrL & JOHN J. DIluLIo, JR., BROOKINGS INST., CUTTING GOVERNMENT 28 (1995).
6. See, e.g., Jerry Mashaw, Reinventing Government and Regulatory Reform: Studies in the
Neglect and Abuse of Administrative Law, 57 U. PITT. L. REV. 405, 408 (1996) (noting that "it is
safe to say that none of our Chief Executives, or their COOs, have been immune to the
management fraternities' panaceas du jour").
7. See, e.g., KETTL & DI[ULIO, supra note 5; PAUL C. LIGHT, THE TIDES OF REFORM:
MAKING GOVERNMENT WORK, 1945-1995 (1997); Mashaw, supra note 6.
8. See LIGHT, supra note 7, at 1.
9. See KETTL & DIlULIO, supra note 5, at 28.
10. Hearing To Examine Restructuring Issues Within the Immigration and Naturalization
Service Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 107th Cong., 2002 WL 853468 (2002) (statement of
Rom Mazzoli, former Chair of the House Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees, and International
Law).
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of 9/11.11 The five proposals are: (1) the INS's internal reorganization
plan;' 2 (2) and (3) the main House (Sensenbrenner-Gekas) 13 and Senate
(Brownback-Kennedy) 14 proposals to create a new immigration agency
with a sharper separation between service and enforcement bureaus; (4) the
Bush Administration's plan to subsume an unchanged INS into the
proposed Department of Homeland Security;1 5 and (5) the likely legislative
compromise to shift the INS's enforcement functions to the Department of
Homeland Security and to leave the service functions in the Department of
Justice (DOJ).16
Each proposal, except for the Administration's original Homeland
Security plan, seeks to reorganize the INS along functional lines. The INS's
internal reorganization plan would create separate enforcement and service
bureaus at the national and field office levels. 17 This plan would attempt to
strengthen coordination and oversight by consolidating agency-wide
responsibilities for information management, budget, legal matters, and
policy and planning in executive positions within the Office of the
Commissioner.1 8 The INS would remain within the DOJ. 19
In contrast, the Sensenbrenner-Gekas and Brownback-Kennedy
proposals go further in calling for a more comprehensive division of
immigration functions into service and enforcement bureaus.2 Both of
these proposals call for the formal abolition of the INS and the creation of a
11. A myriad of other reorganization proposals have been raised, such as the Immigration and
Naturalization Service Reorganization Act of 2002, H.R. 4108, 107th Cong. This bill, which was
introduced on April 9, 2002, proposed the creation of a Bureau for Immigration Enforcement
within the Department of Justice and the delegation of the INS's service functions to the State
Department. However, H.R. 4108 has been overshadowed by the proposals discussed in this
Comment, which have been the focal points of the ongoing debate.
12. The Bush Administration approved and designed the INS's internal restructuring plan.
This plan focuses on changes within the INS that could be effected without statutory changes. See
generally DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE RESTRUCTURING
PROPOSAL (2001), at http://www.ins.gov/graphics/aboutins/restruct/proposal.pdf.
13. Barbara Jordan Immigration Reform and Accountability Act of 2002, H.R. 3231, 107th
Cong. The bill was approved by the House on April 25, 2002.
14. Immigration Reform, Accountability, and Security Enhancement Act of 2002, S. 2444,
107th Cong. This bill was introduced on May 2, 2002.
15. The original version of the Administration's proposal was introduced in the House on
June 24, 2002. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. §§ 401-403 (original
version).
16. The amended version of the Administration's proposal was approved by the House on
July 26, 2002. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. §§ 411-428,441-446
(approved version).
17. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 22.
18. See id. at 24-26.
19. See id. at 3.
20. See Barbara Jordan Immigration Reform and Accountability Act of 2002, H.R. 3231,
107th Cong. §§ 2-6; Immigration Reform, Accountability, and Security Enhancement Act of
2002, S. 2444, 107th Cong. §§ 101-105.
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new immigration agency within the DOJ. 2' These proposals appear
designed to elevate the prominence of a new immigration agency and its
potential influence on DOJ policy and to give the agency a fresh start.22
The Sensenbrenner-Gekas and Brownback-Kennedy proposals differ in
some significant respects. The Sensenbrenner-Gekas proposal goes further
in attempting to micromanage reforms through the reorganization plan. This
plan mandates the creation of specific officers, defines their substantive
roles, and even imposes an annual rotation system for managerial staff.23 In
contrast, the Brownback-Kennedy plan grants agency leaders a greater
degree of discretion to determine the substantive roles for newly created
officers and agency divisions.24 The plan would empower the agency
director to mold the composition of personnel by providing compensation
flexibility to allow for recruitment, retainment, and early retirement
incentives for staff.25 The Brownback-Kennedy proposal also establishes a
new institutional framework and substantive protections for unaccompanied
illegal immigrant children.26
The original version of the Homeland Security Act proposed by the
Administration seeks to merge the INS into the new Office of Homeland
Security. This proposal would vest control of the INS in the Undersecretary
for Border and Transportation Security and combine the INS with the Coast
Guard, the Customs Service of the Treasury Department, and the Transport
Security Administration of the Department of Transportation, as well as
parts of other agencies. 2 7 The Administration's proposal is silent as to what
internal changes in the INS may be necessary to effect this merger.28 This
proposal also does not address whether this plan is designed to redress the
problems facing the INS or only to address broader national security
challenges.
The Senate is currently considering the amended version of the
Homeland Security Act that has been approved by the House.29 This
proposal would shift the enforcement functions of the INS to the Office of
Homeland Security by creating a Bureau of Border Security led by the
21. See H.R. 3231 § 2; S. 2444 §§ 101-102.
22. The House proposal emphasizes this point by calling for the elevation of the formal status
of the agency director to that of an associate attorney general. See HR. 3231 § 2(b).
23. See id. § 6(a)(4).
24. See S. 2444 §§ 102-105.
25. Compare id. §§ 201-205 (providing flexibility for hiring and retainment compensation),
with H.R. 3231 § 11 (granting fumds for early retirement incentives only during the restructuring).
26. See S. 2444 §§ 301-361.
27. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. §§ 401-403 (original
version).
28. See id. § 402.
29. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. (approved version).
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Undersecretary for Border and Transportation Security.3 ° The amended bill
would keep immigration service functions within the DOJ under a Bureau
of Citizenship and Immigration Services. 31 In the bill's current form the two
new bureaus incorporate many features of the Sensenbrenner-Gekas
proposal, such as detailed provisions concerning new managerial roles.
The final legislative compromise will likely contain elements of the
Sensenbrenner-Gekas and Brownback-Kennedy proposals concerning
internal changes in the new bureaus.
II
The enactment of a reorganization bill affecting the INS appears to be
only a matter of time. On the eve of an election, both Congress and the
Administration are eager to demonstrate that they have addressed the
failures of the INS and strengthened our national security. Disputes over
labor issues in the Homeland Security Act and the Administration's heavy-
handedness may stall legislation in the short term.33 Given the pressure for a
reorganization plan, however, the question is which proposal has the most
potential to reform the INS or, alternatively, poses the least risk for harm.
With the exception of the Administration's Homeland Security plan,
the proposals share the premise that a functional division along service and
enforcement lines constitutes "a big step towards enabling the Federal
Government to effectively manage our Nation's immigration policy., 34 The
creation of new chains of command along functional lines may enhance
communication, accountability, and coordination. Shaking up the INS's
staid agency culture may help to promote greater flexibility and openness to
new ideas. Given the relentless criticism the INS has faced, proposals to
create successor agencies may be valuable for the sole reason that they give
a beleaguered leadership and staff the appearance of a fresh start.
However, as Congressman Melvin Watt has opined, it is equally
possible that moving "the most inefficient government agency in
America... down the hall and making it a two-headed monster will not
make the agency more efficient." 35 Glenn A. Fine, the DOJ Inspector
General, has gone further in arguing that separating the INS into two parts
"might merely compound the deficiencies in the agency's management
30. See id. § 412.
31. See id. § 421.
32. See id. §§ 412-413, 421-423.
33. See Steven Greenhouse, Labor Issue May Stall Security Bill, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 2002,
at A22.
34. See 148 CONG. REC. H1626 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. John Linder).
35. See 148 CONG. REC. H1632-33 (daily ed. Apr. 25, 2002) (statement of Rep. Melvin
Watt).
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controls, systems and accountability. '36 A reorganization along functional
lines or the relocation of the INS's functions may allow elected leaders to
campaign as individuals who have addressed the problems facing the INS.
There is no reason, however, to believe that such changes will necessarily
enhance the effectiveness of a successor to the INS.
The INS's internal reorganization plan highlights these shortcomings.
The plan proclaims that its implementation would accomplish a
"fundamental reform" of the agency.37 This proposal, however, appears
notable for how little it is likely to accomplish beyond creating the
appearance of action by dividing the agency along functional lines. This
approach is a poor substitute for reform, since it fails to address the
substantive problems facing the agency or to give the agency director new
tools to effect internal changes.
The Sensenbrenner-Gekas and Brownback-Kennedy proposals and the
amended Homeland Security Bill also overstate the potential of a functional
reorganization of the agency to effect needed reforms. In each of these bills
politicians emphasize the formal abolition of the INS. While the name
change may be intended to emphasize hopes for a dramatic transformation
of the agency, it is unclear that this name change amounts to more than an
attempt to score political points.
The Sensenbrenner-Gekas and Brownback-Kennedy plans and the
amended Homeland Security Bill do give the directors of the successor
agencies new tools to effect ongoing reforms. Each bill also creates an
independent ombudsman to hear complaints concerning the INS's service
functions in an effort to foster greater accountability to the public.38 All
three bills provide additional funding flexibility, so that agency directors
may provide incentives for early retirement. The Brownback-Kennedy
proposal has the additional virtue of providing greater flexibility for the
hiring and retainment of workers, so that the director may more actively
shape the composition of agency personnel.
The shortcoming of the Sensenbrenner-Gekas Bill and the amended
Homeland Security Bill is that they err on the side of micromanagement by
attempting to define the substantive roles of officers. Both bills attempt to
impose a managerial rotation system for administrators of the agency and to
dictate in part the way in which the agency should be run.39 In contrast, the
36. See Eric Schmitt, Agency Finds Itself Under Siege, with Many Responsibilities and Many
Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2002, at A11.
37. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 12, at 4.
38. See Barbara Jordan Immigration Reform and Accountability Bill of 2002, H.R. 3231,
107th Cong. § 5; Homeland Security Act of 2002, H.R. 5005, 107th Cong. § 422 (approved
version); Immigration Reform, Accountability, and Security Enhancement Act of 2002, S. 2444,
107th Cong. § 106.
39. See H.R. 3231 § 6; H.R. 5005 §§ 412, 423 (approved version).
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Brownback-Kennedy proposal appears to grant agency leaders a greater
degree of discretion on how to implement the reorganization and manage
the agency on an ongoing basis. For these reasons, the Brownback-Kennedy
proposal offers advantages over the Sensenbrenner-Gekas proposal and the
amended Homeland Security Bill.
While all of the proposals have shortcomings, the Administration's
Homeland Security Bill is noteworthy for the fact that it ignores the thorny
problems of reforming the INS in favor of focusing on a macro "solution"
to America's homeland security challenges. 40 A one-stop shop for point-of-
entry controls that consists of more than 169,000 federal workers and a
$37.4 billion budget looks impressive on paper.4 1 Combining the Coast
Guard, the Customs Service, the INS, and many other agencies signifies the
Administration's commitment to homeland security concerns and may be a
first step toward enhancing interagency communication and coordination.
The creation of this superagency may result in little more, however, than
forcing a host of agencies to order new letterhead and change their seals.
Worse still, the Department of Homeland Security may become a
bureaucratic juggernaut, whose unmanageability may magnify the
shortcomings of each component agency.
As importantly, the danger exists that the relocation of the INS into the
Department of Homeland Security will subordinate all other goals and
functions of the INS to national security concerns. This outcome may
appease the popular desire for the appearance of action on homeland
security. In the long term, however, this focus may create many more
problems for immigration policy than it solves, if only by obscuring the
importance of other pressing concerns facing the INS.
The amended Homeland Security Bill attempts to avert this danger by
retaining the service functions of the INS in a new bureau within the DOJ.
42
By "solving" one problem, this approach may create a more significant one
by allowing inconsistencies to arise between the service and enforcement
bureaus. Relocating only enforcement functions to the Department of
Homeland Security may accentuate the shift of the enforcement focus
toward national security issues by reducing internal policymakers'
awareness of service concerns. September 11 th helped to highlight the
importance of immigration issues. In the long term, however, one ironic
40. Then-INS Commissioner James Ziglar indicated that "[t]he President's plan will pre-empt
all other restructuring proposals," which suggests that the INS's internal restructuring plan will be
on hold indefinitely. Press Release, Message to INS Employees from Commissioner Ziglar on the
President's Announcement of the Formation of the Department of Homeland Security (June 7,
2002), at http://www.ins.gov/graphics/publicaffairs/statements/securityformation.htm.
41. See GEORGE W. BUSH, TffE DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY REPORT (2002), at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/deptofhomeland/book.pdf.
42. See H.R. 5005 § 421 (approved version).
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legacy of this tragedy may be a lower profile for immigration issues, if
separate immigration bureaus are subsumed under larger agencies.
The virtue of the Sensenbrenner-Gekas and Brownback-Kennedy
proposals is that they avoid this danger by keeping a single successor
agency within the DOJ. There are risks that location within the DOJ will
continue to bias the INS toward a predominantly enforcement function. At
the same time, the Sensenbrenner-Gekas and Brownback-Kennedy
proposals are designed to elevate the profile of the immigration agency and
immigration issues. Their focus on functional reorganization may not lead
to the desired reforms, yet they pose fewer dangers than either the original
or amended versions of the Homeland Security Bill. Among these two
proposals, the Brownback-Kennedy proposal appears preferable because it
seeks to accomplish less through reorganization, and gives the agency
director more tools and flexibility to effect future changes.
III
While the Brownback-Kennedy proposal appears preferable to the other
plans on the table, politicians have little reason to place faith in
reorganizations. September 11 th opened many eyes to the problems that
plague the INS. A quick fix through restructuring alone cannot, however,
address the unclear and often conflicting priorities of our immigration
policies and the ineffective tools that the agency has at its disposal.
Crafting an effective immigration policy requires reconsidering the
extent to which economic, foreign policy, cultural, or national security
interests should be the national priority. An immigration policy designed to
stop potential terror threats will look very different from one designed to
halt rising levels of illegal immigration. A visa policy that favors tourism
and respects the need for skilled and unskilled laborers will be far different
from one focused on national security or foreign policy concerns.
Clarifying the priorities of our immigration policy in the wake of 9/11 will
do more to enhance U.S. immigration policy than any restructuring plan.
In the short term, a reorganization plan for the INS may be a necessary
evil to assuage the popular desire for action. Nonetheless, politicians should
do more than make hollow promises of reform through reorganization.
They should also be leading a national debate to redefine the priorities for
immigration policy. September 11 th provided an occasion to consider far-
reaching reforms to immigration policy, and neither politicians nor the
American people should be content to let reorganization substitute for
reform.
-Jeffrey Manns
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